An intelligent agent uses known facts, including statistical knowledge, to assign degrees of belief to assertions it is uncertain about. We i n vestigate three principled techniques for doing this. All three are applications of the principle of indi erence, because they assign equal degree of belief to all basic \situations" consistent with the knowledge base. They di er because there are competing intuitions about what the basic situations are. Various natural patterns of reasoning, such as the preference for the most speci c statistical data available, turn out to follow from some or all of the techniques. This is an improvement o ver earlier theories, such a s w ork on direct inference and reference classes, which arbitrarily postulate these patterns without o ering any deeper explanations or guarantees of consistency.
Introduction
An intelligent agent m ust be able to use its accumulated knowledge to help it reason about the situation it is currently facing. Consider a doctor who has a knowledge base consisting of statistical and rst-order information regarding symptoms and diseases, and some speci c information regarding a particular patient. She wants to make an inference regarding the likelihood that the patient has cancer. The inference of such a l i k elihood, or degree o f b elief, is an essential step in decision making. We present here a general and principled mechanism
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for computing degrees of belief. This mechanism has a number of particular realizations which di er in the inferences they support. Through an analysis of these differences and of the principles which underlie the general mechanism, we are able to o er a number of important new insights into this form of reasoning.
To illustrate some of the subtle issues that arise when trying to compute degrees of belief, suppose that the domain consists of American males, and that the agent is interested in assigning a degree of belief to the proposition \Eric (an American male) is (over six feet) tall" given some subset of the following database:
A 20% of American males are tall. B 25% of Californian males are tall. C Eric is a Californian male.
A traditional approach to assigning a degree of belief to Tall(Eric) is to nd an appropriate class|called the reference class|which includes Eric and for which w e have statistical information, and use the statistics for that class to compute an appropriate degree of belief for Eric. Thus, if the agent's database consists solely of item A, then this approach w ould attach a quite reasonable degree of belief of 0.2 to Tall(Eric) using the reference class of American males.
This general approach to computing degrees of belief goes under the name direct inference, and dates back to Reichenbach Rei49] , who used the idea in an attempt to reconcile his frequency interpretation of probability with the common practice of attaching probabilities to particular cases. He expounded a principle for direct inference, but did not develop a complete mechanism. Subsequently, a great deal of work has been done on formalizing and mechanizing direct inference Bac90, Kyb61, Kyb74, Lev80, Pol90, Sal71] .
If the database consists only of A, there is only one reference class to which Eric is known to belong, so applying direct inference is easy. In general, however, the particular individual or collection of individuals we a r e reasoning about will belong to many di erent classes. We might possess con icting statistics for some of these classes, and for others we might not possess any statistical information at all. The di culty with direct inference, then, is how t o c hoose an appropriate reference class. There are a number of issues that arise in such a choice, but we focus here on three particular problems. Speci c Information: Suppose the knowledge base consists of all three items A{C. N o w Eric is a member of two reference classes: Americans and Californians. Intuition suggests that in this case we should choose the more speci c class, Californians. And indeed, all of the systems cited above e m body a preference for more speci c information, yielding 0.25 as the degree of belief in Tall(Eric) in this case.
However, we m ust be careful in applying such a preference. For one thing, we m ust deal with the problem of disjunctive reference classes. Consider the disjunctive class D consisting of Eric and all non-tall Californian males. Being a subset of Californian males this is clearly a more speci c reference class. If there are many Californians (and thus many non-tall Californians, since 75% of Californians are not tall), using D as the reference class gives a degree of belief for Tall(Eric) that is very close to 0. The answer 0.25 seems far more reasonable, showing that we m ust be careful about how we i n terpret the principle of preference for more speci c information. We remark that two of the most welldeveloped systems of direct inference, Kyburg Irrelevant Information: Suppose that the knowledge base consists only of items A and C. In this case Eric again belongs to two reference classes, but now w e d o not have a n y statistics for the more speci c class, Californians. The standard, and plausible, approach i s t o assign a degree of belief of 0.2 to Tall(Eric). That is, we use the statistics from the superclass, American males this amounts to assuming that the extra information, that Eric is also Californian, is irrelevant. In the face of no knowledge to the contrary, w e assume that the subclass has the same statistics as the superclass.
Sampling: Finally, suppose the knowledge base consists only of B. I n t h i s c a s e w e h a ve statistical information about Californians, but all we know about Eric is that he is an American. We could assume that Californians are a representative sample of American when it comes to male tallness, and adopt the statistics we have for the class of Californians generating a degree of belief of 0.25 in Tall(Eric).
The process of nding the \right" reference class, and then assigning degrees of belief using the further assumption that the individual in question is randomly chosen from this class, is one way of going from statistical and rst-order information to a degree of belief. But, as we h a ve s e e n , c hoosing the right reference class is a complex issue. It is typically accomplished by p o s i ting some collection of rules for choosing among competing reference classes, e.g., Kyb83] . However, such rules are not easy to formulate. More importantly, they do not provide any general principles which can help elucidate our intuitions about how statistics should in uence degrees of belief. Indeed, the whole idea of reference class seems arti cial it does not occur at all in the statement of the problem we are trying to solve. We present a di erent approach to computing degrees of belief here, one that does not involve nding appropriate reference classes at all. We believe i t i s a m o r e general, high-level approach, that deals well with the three problems discussed above and, as we s h o w i n t h e full paper, many others besides.
The essential idea is quite straightforward: We view the information in the database as determining a set of situations that the agent considers possible. In order to capture the intuition that the information in our knowledge base is \all we know," we assign each of these possible situations equal probability. After all, our information does not give u s a n y reason to give a n y of them greater probability t h a n a n y other. Roughly speaking, the agent's degree of belief in a sentence such as Tall Kri86] or the principle of indi erence Key21].
Our general method, then, revolves around applying indi erence to some collection of possible situations. The method has a number of di erent realizations, as there are competing intuitions involved in de ning a \possible situation." We focus on three particular mechanisms for de ning situations, each o f w h i c h l e a d s to a di erent method of computing degrees of belief. The di erences between the three methods re ect different i n tuitions about how degrees of belief should be generated from statistics. They also point out the important role of language in this process.
Although the approaches are di erent, they share some reasonable properties. For example, as we s h o w i n Section 3, they all generalize deductive inference, they all agree with direct inference in noncontroversial cases, and they all capture a preference for more speci c information. Furthermore, since our general method does not depend on nding reference classes, the problem of disjunctive classes completely disappears.
Despite these similarities, the methods di er in a number of signi cant w ays (see Section 3). So which method is \best"? Since all the methods are de ned in terms of assigning equal probability to all possible situations, the question comes down to which notion of \situation" is most appropriate. As we s h o w, that depends on what intuitions we are trying to capture. Our framework allows us to obtain an understanding of when each method is most appropriate. In addition, it gives us the tools to consider other methods, and hybrids of these methods. Because there is no unique \best" answer, this is a matter of major importance.
There has been a great deal of work that can be viewed as attempts to generate degrees of belief given a database. Besides the work on reference classes mentioned above, much o f J a ynes's work on maximum entropy Jay78] can be viewed in this vein. Perhaps the work closest in spirit to ours is that of Carnap Car52], Johnson Joh32] , and the more recent w ork of Paris and Vencovska PV89, PV91] and Goodwin Goo92]. We compare our work with these others in some detail in the full paper here we can only give brief hints of the relationship.
The Three Methods
We assume that the knowledge base consists of sentences written in a formal language that allows us to express both statistical information and rst-order information. In particular, we use a simpli ed version of a probability logic developed in Bac90] and Hal90], which w e describe very brie y here.
To represent the statistical information, we augment rst-order logic by a l l o wing proportion formu l a s o f t h e form k (x)k x , which denotes the proportion of individuals in the domain satisfying when instantiated for x.
Notice that this proportion is well de ned in any rstorder model (over an appropriate vocabulary) if the model's domain is nite in the following, this will always be the case. For example, kCalifornian (x)k x = :1 says that 10% of the domain elements are Californians, while kTall (x)jCalifornian (x)k x = :25 says that 25% of Californians are tall, via the standard abbreviation for conditional probabilities (and thus represents assertion B from the introduction). 1 We w ant to use the information in the knowledge base to compute a degree of belief. Note that there is an important distinction between statistical information such as \25% of Californian males are tall" and a degree of belief such as \the likelihood that Eric is tall is .25". The former represents real-world data, while the latter is attached by the agent, hopefully using a principled method, to assertions about the world that are, in fact, either true or false. Following Hal90], we g i v e semantics to degrees of belief in terms of a set of rst-order models or possible worlds, together with a probability distribution over this set. The degree of belief in a sentence ' is just the probability of the set of worlds where ' is true. For our method the set of possible worlds is easily described: given a vocabulary and domain size N, it is the collection of all rst-order structures over the vocabulary with domain f1 : : : N g. The probability distribution is generated by a p p l ying the principle of indi erence to equivalence classes of worlds (\situations"). We assign equal probability to every equivalence class, and then, applying the principle of indi erence again, we divide up the probability assigned to each class equally among the individual worlds in that class.
Alternate realizations of our method arise from different i n tuitions as to how to group the worlds into equivalence classes. We consider three natural groupings, which lead to the three methods mentioned in the introduction. (Of course, other methods are possible, but we focus on these three for now, deferring further discussion to the full paper.) Once we h a ve the probability distribution on the worlds, we compute the degree of belief in ' given a database KB by using straightforward conditional probability: it is simply the probability of the set of worlds where '^KB is true divided by the probability of the set of worlds where KB is true.
In this paper we restrict attention to vocabularies having only constants and unary predicates. Our methods make perfect sense when applied to richer vocabularies (see the full paper), but the characterizations of these methods given in Section 3 hold only in the unary case.
In the rst approach, which w e call the randomworlds approach, we i d e n tify situations and worlds. Hence, by the principle of indi erence, each w orld is assigned equal probability.
In the second approach, which w e call the randomstructures approach, we group into a single equivalence class worlds that are isomorphic with respect to the predicates in the vocabulary. 2 By indi erence, we a ssign equal probability to each class and then divide up that probability equally among the worlds in that class. The intuition underlying this approach is that individuals with exactly the same properties are in some sense indistinguishable, so worlds where they are simply renamed should be treated as being equivalent.
Suppose, for example, that our vocabulary consists of a unary predicate P and a constant c, and that the domain size is N. Since P can denote any s u b s e t , and c any member, of the domain, there will be N2 N possible worlds, each with a distinct interpretation of the vocabulary. In the random-worlds approach e a c h world is an equally likely situation with equal probability. In the random-structures approach, on the other hand, worlds in which the cardinality o f P's denotation is the same are isomorphic, and thus will all be grouped into a single situation. Hence, there are only N + 1 equally likely situations, one for each possible size of P's denotation. Each situation is assigned probability 1 =(N +1) and that probability is divided equally among the N ; N k worlds in that situation, where k is the cardinality o f P's denotation in that situation. So, ac-2 Note that we only consider the predicate denotations when deciding on a world's equivalence class, and ignore the denotations of constants. This is consistent with Carnap's approach Car52], and is crucial for our results. See the full paper for further discussion of this point.
cording to random-worlds, it is much more likely that the number of individuals satisfying P is bN=2c than that it is 1, whereas for random-structures these two possibilities are equally likely.
More generally, suppose the vocabulary consists of the unary predicate symbols P 1 : : : P k and the constants c 1 : : : c. W e can consider the 2 k atoms that can be formed from the predicate symbols, namely, t h e formulas of the form Q 1^: : : Q k , where each Q i is either P i or :P i . I f w e h a ve a domain of size N, there will be N`(2 N ) k possible worlds, corresponding to all choices for the denotations of the`constants and k predicates. Given two possible worlds w 1 and w 2 , i t is easy to see that they are isomorphic with respect to the predicates if and only if for every atom the number of individuals satisfying that atom in w 1 is the same as in w 2 . This means that a random-structures situation is completely described by a tuple (d 1 : : : d 2 k) with d 1 + + d 2 k = N, specifying how m a n y domain elements satisfy each atom. Using standard combinatorics, it can be shown that there are exactly ; N +2 k ;1 2 k ;1 such situations.
The third method we consider, which w e call the random-propensities approach, attempts to measure the propensity of an individual to satisfy each o f t h e predicates. If our vocabulary contains the unary predicates P 1 : : : P k and the domain has size N, t h e n a situation in this approach is speci ed by a t u p l e (e 1 : : : e k ) the worlds contained in this situation are all those where e i of the domain elements satisfy P i , f o r all i. 3 Intuitively, e i =N is a measure of the propensity of an individual to have property P i . It is not di cult to see that there are (N + 1 ) k distinct situations. As before, we rst assign equal probability t o e a c h s i t u ation and then divide that probability equally among the worlds in that situation.
Suppose, for example, that the vocabulary consists of the unary predicates P and Q and that the domain consists of three elements fa b cg. There are (2 3 ) 2 = 64 distinct possible worlds, one for each c hoice of denotation for P and Q. In the random-worlds approach each of these worlds will be assigned probability 1 =64. In the random-structures approach there are ; 3+2 2 ;1 2 2 ;1 = ; 6 3 = 20 distinct situations. Each w i l l b e given probability 1/20 and that probability will then be divided equally among the worlds in the situation.
For example, the world w that assigns P the denotation fag and Q the denotation fa cg belongs to the situation in which the atom P: Q has size 0 and all other atoms have size 1. There are 6 worlds in this situation, so w will be assigned probability 1 6 20 . In the random-propensities approach there are (3 + 1) 2 = 16 distinct situations. Each w i l l b e g i v en probability 1/16 to be divided equally among the worlds in the situa-3 Note that again we consider only the predicate denotations when deciding on a world's equivalence class.
tion. For example, one of these situations is speci ed by the tuple (1 2) consisting of all those worlds where one element satis es P and two satisfy Q. This situation contains 9 worlds, including the world w speci ed above. Hence, under random-propensities w is assigned probability 1 9 16 . We remark that two of our three methods|the random-worlds method and the random-structures method|are not original to us. They essentially date back to Laplace Lap20], and were investigated in some detail by Carnap Car52] and Johnson Joh32]. We b elieve that the random-propensities method is new as we shall show, it has some quite attractive properties.
If KB is a formula describing the knowledge base,
' is a rst-order sentence, and N is the domain size, we denote by P r the degree of belief in ' given knowledge base KB according to the random-worlds, random-structures, and random-propensities methods, respectively. We w r i t e Pr N ('jKB) in those cases where the degree of belief is independent of the approach. and Pr 1 are similarly de ned. 4 Our methods can also be viewed as placing di erent priors on the set of rst-order structures. Viewed in this way, they are instances of Bayesian inference, since we compute degrees of belief by conditioning on this prior distribution, given our database. But the deepest problem when applying Bayesian inference is always nding the prior distribution, or, even more fundamentally, nding the appropriate space of possibilities. This is precisely the problem we address here.
Understanding the Methods
As a rst step to understanding the three techniques, we look for general properties characterizing their behavior. Then we examine some speci c properties which tell us how the techniques behave i n v arious paradigmatic reasoning situations. Given a database KB we can form the set of tuples dened by the set of worlds which satisfy KB this set can be viewed as the set of proportions consistent w i t h KB.
Let S(KB) denote the closure of this set. 4 There is no guarantee that these limits exist in complex cases, they may not. As our examples suggest, in typical cases they do (see GHK91b]).
We can often nd a single point i n S(KB) that will characterize the degrees of belief generated by our di erent methods. In the random-worlds method this is the maximum entropy point o f S(KB) (see GHK91b, PV89] ). In the random-structures method, the characteristic point is the center of mass of S(KB).
Finally, in the random-propensities method, the characteristic point maximizes the statistical independence of the predicates in the vocabulary. W e formalize these latter two c haracterizations and describe the conditions under which they hold in the full paper. 5 When applicable, the characteristic point determines the degree of belief in ' given KB w e construct a particular probability structure (described also in GHK91b]) whose proportions are exactly those de ned by t h e c haracteristic point. The probability o f ' given KB is exactly the probability o f ' given KB in this particular structure.
Suppose that the vocabulary consists only of fP cg, and the database KB is simply kP (x)k x 2 ]. What does the above tell us about the degree of belief in P(c) under the three methods? In this case, there are only two atoms, P and :P , a n d S(KB) consists of all pairs (p 1 p 2 ) such t h a t p 1 2 ]. Since the random-worlds method tries to maximize entropy, i t focuses on the pair (p 1 p 2 ) where p 1 is as close as possible to 1=2. The random-structures method considers the center of mass of the region of consistent p r o p o rtions, which is clearly attained when p 1 = ( + )=2.
Since there is only one predicate in the vocabulary, the \maximum independence" characterization of the random-propensities method gives no useful information here. However, it can be shown that for this vocabulary, the random-propensities method and the random-structures method give the same answer. Thus, we get Pr w 1 (P (c)jKB) = , where 2 ] minimizes j ; 1 2 j, a n d P r s 1 (P (c)jKB) = P r p 1 (P (c)jKB) = + 2 . 6 Notice also that we w ere careful to say that the vocabulary is fP cg here. Suppose the vocabulary were larger, say fP Q c dg. This change has no impact on the random-worlds and the random-propensities method we still get the same answers as for the smaller vocabulary. In general, the degree of belief in ' given KB does not depend on the vocabulary for these two methods. As shown in GHK91a], this is not true in the case of the random-structures method. We return to this point in the next section.
5
The conditions required vary. Roughly speaking, the maximum-entropy c haracterization of random-worlds almost always works in practice the center-of-mass technique nds degrees of belief for a smaller class of propositions, although there are few restrictions on KB m a x i m umindependence works for most propositions, but is not sucient to handle the fairly common case where S(KB) contains several points that maximize independence equally. 6 All of our methods give p o i n t-valued degrees of belief. In examples like this is may be desirable to allow i n tervalvalued degrees of belief we defer discussion to the full paper.
Properties of the Methods
As we mentioned in the introduction, all of our methods share some reasonable properties. 1) Deductive inference: All three methods generalize deductive inference any fact that follows from the database is given degree of belief 1.
Proposition 1 : If j = KB ) ' then Pr 1 ('jKB) = 1 . 2) Direct inference: All three methods agree with direct inference in noncontroversial cases. To be precise, say the reference class C is speci ed by s o m e f o r m ula (x) we h a ve statistical information about the proportion of C's that satisfy some property ', e.g., the infor-
] and all we know a b o u t a constant c is that it belongs to the class C, i.e., we know only (c). In this case we h a ve only one reference class, and direct inference would use the statistics from this class to generate a degree of belief in '(c). In such cases, all three of our methods also re ect the statistics we h a ve for C.
Proposition 2 : Let c be a constant, and let '(x) (x) be formulas that do not mention c. Then
]. Therefore, in the example from the introduction, if the database consists only of A, then we will obtain a degree of belief of 0:2 from all three methods.
3) Speci c Information: Suppose we h a ve statistics for ' relative to classes C 1 and C 2 . I f C 1 is more speci c, then we generally prefer to use its statistics. 
4) Irrelevant information: Often, databases contain
information that appears to be irrelevant to the problem at hand. We usually want the computed degree of belief to be una ected by this extra information. This turns out to be the case for the random-worlds and the random-propensities methods, but not for the randomstructures method. The proposition below formalizes one special case of this phenomenon. ]. This result demonstrates that if our knowledge base consists of items A and C from the introduction, then we obtain a degree of belief of 0.2 in Tall(Eric) u sing either random-worlds or random-propensities these methods allow us to inherit statistics from superclasses, thus treating subclasses for which w e h a ve no special statistical information as irrelevant. In contrast, the random-structures method assigns a degree of belief of 0.5 to Tall(Eric) in this example. This can be quite reasonable in certain situations, since if the subclass is worthy of a name, it might be special in some way, and our statistics for the superclass might not apply. 5) Sampling: Suppose kQ(x)k x = and kP (x)jQ(x)k x = . I n tuitively, here we w ant to think of as being small, so that Q de nes a small sample of the total domain. We k n o w the proportion of P's in this small sample is . Can we use this information when the appropriate reference class is the entire domain? In a sense, this is a situation which i s d u a l t o t h e previous one, since the reference class we a r e i n terested in is larger than that for which w e h a ve statistics (Q). One plausible choice in this case is to use the statistics from the smaller class i.e., treat it as sample data from which w e can induce information relevant to the superset. This is what is done by the random-propensities method. The random-worlds method and the randomstructures method enforce a di erent i n tuition since we have no information whatsoever as to the overall proportion of P's satisfying :Q, w e assume by default that it is 1=2. Thus, on a fraction of the domain, the proportion of P's is , on the remaining fraction (1 ; ) of the domain, the proportion of P's is 1=2. This says that the proportion of P's is + ( 1 ; )=2. There are reasonable intuitions behind both answers here. The rst, as we h a ve already said, corresponds to sampling. For the second, we could argue that since the class Q is su ciently distinguished to merit a name in our language, it might be dangerous to treat it as a random sample.
These propositions are just a small sample of the patterns of reasoning encountered in practice. But they demonstrate that the issues we raised in the introduction are handled well by our approach. Furthermore, in those cases where the methods di er, they serve to highlight competing intuitions about what the \reasonable inference" is. The fact that our techniques automatically give reasonable answers for these basic problems leads us to believe that our approach is a useful way t o attack the problem.
Understanding the Alternatives
How d o w e decide which, if any, of our three techniques is appropriate in a particular situation? We d o n o t h a ve a universal criterion. Nevertheless, as we n o w s h o w, the di erent methods make implicit assumptions about language and the structure of the domain. By examining these assumptions we can o er some suggestions as to when one method might be preferable to another.
Recall that random-structures groups isomorphic worlds together, in e ect treating the domain elements as indistinguishable. If the elements are distinguishable, random-worlds may be a more appropriate model. We remark that this issue of distinguishability i s o f c r ucial importance in statistical physics and quantum mechanics. However, there are situations where it is not as critical. In particular, we s h o w i n G H K 9 1 a ] and in the full paper that, as long as there are \enough" predicates in the vocabulary, the random-worlds method and the random-structures method are essentially equivalent. \Enough" here means \su cient" to distinguish the elements in the domain in a domain of size N, i t turns out that 3 log N unary predicates su ce. Hence, the di erence between distinguishability and indistinguishability can often be explained in terms of the richness of our vocabulary.
The random-propensities method gives the language an even more central role. It assumes that there is information implicit in the choice of predicates. To illustrate this phenomenon, consider the well-known \grue/bleen" paradox Goo55]. A person who has seen many emeralds, all of which w ere green, might place a high degree of belief in \All emeralds are green." Now suppose that, as well as the concepts green and blue, we also consider \grue"|green before the year 2000, and blue after|and \bleen" (blue before 2000, and green after). All the green emeralds that anyone has seen are also grue, but no one believes that \All emeralds are grue." Inferring \grueness" seems unintuitive. This suggests that inductive reasoning must go beyond logical expressiveness to use judgements about which predicates are most \natural."
This intuition is captured by the random-propensities approach. Consider the following simpli ed version of the \grue/bleen" paradox. Let the vocabulary c o n s i s t o f t wo unary predicates, G (for \green") and B (for \before the year 2000"), and a constant c. We identify \Blue" with \not green" and take \Grue" to be (G^B) _ (:G: B). 7 The domain elements are observations of emeralds. If our database KB is kG(x)jB(x)k x = 1, then using Proposition 5 we can show t h a t P r To understand this phenomenon, recall that the random-worlds and random-structures methods treat \grue" and \green" symmetrically they are both the union of two atoms. The random-propensities method, on the other hand, gives \green" special status as a predicate in the vocabulary.
The importance of the choice of predicates in the random-propensities approach can be partially explained in terms of an important connection between it and the random-worlds approach. Suppose we a r e interested in the predicate Tall. A standard approach to de ning the semantics of Tall is to order individuals according to height, and choose a cuto point such that an individual is considered \tall" exactly if he is taller than the cuto . It turns out that if we add this implicit information about the meaning of Tall to the knowledge base, and use the random-worlds approach, we obtain the random-propensities approach. Intuitively, the location of the cuto point re ects the propensity of a random individual to be tall. Many predicates can be interpreted in a similar fashion, and randompropensities might be an appropriate method in these cases. However, many problems will include di erent kinds of predicates, requiring di erent treatment. Therefore, in most practical situations, a combination of the methods would almost certainly be used.
In conclusion, we believe t h a t w e h a ve o ered an important new approach to the problem of computing degrees of belief from statistics. Our approach relies on notions that seem to be much more fundamental than the traditional notion of \choosing the right reference class." As should be clear from our examples, none of the three methods discussed here is universally applicable. Instead, they seem to represent g e n uine alternate intuitions applicable to di erent situations. We feel that the elucidation of these alternate intuitions is in itself a useful contribution.
